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Malaysia’s Relations with Saudi Arabia Under
Tun Dr. Mahathir Era, 1981-2003
Asmady Idris
Abstract
Malaysia’s early formal relation with Saudi Arabia begun since the late 
Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra al-Haj era (the fi rst Malaysian Premier, 
1957-1970) until present. During the reign of Tun Dr. Mahathir, the 
fourth Malaysian Premier, the relation has changed dynamically. Several 
initiatives have been taken by the Tun Dr. Mahathir regime to shift the 
pattern of relations from one to two way communication. Apart from 
successfully securing economic opportunities from the kingdom, this study 
attempts to relate the signifi cance of the relations to the Tun Dr. Mahathir 
regime with its eff orts to portray religious commitment, both at domestic 
and international level.  e promotion of Islam by Malaysian leaders, 
both at home, and at the international level, is vital for the continuation 
of their political survival.  Equipped with more liberal-pragmatic Islamic 
approach has, to some extent, prolonged the survival of the Tun Dr. 
Mahathir’s political regime interests.
INTRODUCTION
Malaysia’s early formal relation with Saudi Arabia begun since the late 
Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra al-Haj era (the fi rst Malaysian Premier, 
1957-1970, died in 1990) until present. Tunku’s fi rst visit as Prime 
Minister to Saudi Arabia was on the 18 of June 1958 where he performed 
pilgrimage in Mecca to give thanks to God for giving Malaya (later 
became Malaysia) full independence from Great Britain. Since then, it 
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was followed by a series of visit of other Malaysian Premiers including 
Tun Abdul Razak (the second Premier, 1970-1976), Tun Hussein Onn 
(the third Premier, 1976-1981), and Tun Dr. Mahathir, (the fourth 
Premier, 1981-2003, the focal point of this study). 
In fact, it can be said that the Malaysian premiers have taken proactive 
eff orts to enhance Malaysia’s relation with Saudi Arabia but not vice versa. 
" is is because it has to be admitted that visits of the Al-Saud family 
rulers to Malaysia have not been as frequent as the tours made by the 
Malaysian leaders to the Kingdom. From the reign of King Saud (1953-
1964), with the exception of the fi rst leader of Saudi Arabia, King Abdul 
Aziz (1932-1953) because Malaysia had yet to achieve independence 
during his term, to King Feisal (1964-1975), King Khaled (1975-1982), 
and King Fahd (1982-2004),1  it was only King Feisal that made a trip to 
Malaysia to discuss some related issues with the fi rst Malaysian premier, 
the late Tunku Abdul Rahman, in 1970.2 
Despite the lack of visits by Al-Saud family rulers to Malaysia, this 
does not simply lead to an indication that the Saudi rulers had ignored 
its relations with the Malaysian government. Instead, the Malaysian 
premiers have to avow that they have to interact fi rst with Al-Saud family 
rulers for they need the latter’s contribution and co-operation more, for 
instance in obtaining fi nancial aid or in fulfi lling the Islamic appeal of 
the Malaysian Muslim community particularly in doing pilgrimage 
activities in the Kingdom, and not vice-versa. With the continuous eff orts 
carried out by the Malaysian leaders to attract the attention of the Saudi 
government, Malaysia had benefi ted greatly by receiving some fi nancial 
assistance, securing political recognition, and other related issues that 
further strengthened Malaysia’s relation with the Kingdom including 
pilgrimage and education issues. 
1 For the duration of each Saudi Kings’ reign see for instance, " e Saudi Arabia Information 
Resource, “Kings of Saudi Arabia”, (http://www.saudinf.com/main/b43.htm). 
2 “Majlis Santapan Di-Raja Kerana Meraikan D.Y.M.M Seri Paduka Baginda Al-Malik 
Faisal Ibni Abdul Aziz Al-Saud, Saudi Arabia, Istana Negara, June 7, 1970”, Rekod 
Pandang dan Dengar, National Archive of Malaysia, (1999/0023163).
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Based on the above point, it is the main task of this study to analyze 
the signifi cance of the Malaysian government particularly under Tun Dr. 
Mahathir era in safeguarding its close ties with Saudi Arabia. Without 
full ignorance of the real politik notion3,  the study inevitably presumes 
that those eff orts taken by the Tun Dr. Mahathir regime in preserving 
bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia were, more or less, concerned with 
the struggle of his political wishes. It is not the objective of this study, 
however, to undermine those valuable eff orts in bringing Malaysia 
closer to Saudi Arabia, but it should be highlighted that there are some 
indications that there are links between those eff orts and the Tun Dr. 
Mahathir’s political signifi cance. In other words, this study would like 
to argue that the need of Tun Dr. Mahathir’s government to preserve its 
relations with the kingdom is largely to fulfi l the survival of his political 
regime’s interests. 
Among the major facet of political interests that can be associated to 
Tun Dr. Mahathir’s administration in safeguarding Malaysia’s relations 
with Saudi Arabia, apart from securing economic opportunities from 
the Kingdom which will be highlighted later during the Tun Dr. 
Mahathir’s visit to Saudi Arabia, might also be for the portrayal of the 
Tun Dr. Mahathir regime in upholding its religious commitment, both at 
domestic and international level. " is is because the promotion of Islam 
by Malaysian leaders, both at home, and at the international level, is vital 
for their continuous political survival.4 " e attempt to relate this issue 
of religious commitment to the signifi cance of Malaysia’s relations with 
the Kingdom, especially during Tun Dr. Mahathir era, is mainly due to 
the nature of the relations which have been historically overwhelmingly 
established on ‘socio-religious orientation’ (pilgrimage and education) 
3 In real politik, some researchers will argue that most of the eff orts or initiatives undertaken 
by leaders for their country are merely for the survival of their political regimes or for the 
continuation of the dominance of their own party struggle over others.
4 See for instance, Mohamad Abu Bakar, “Islam in Malaysia’s Foreign Policy”, Hamdard 
Islamicus xiii (1) 1990, 3-13, Diane K. Mauzy & R.S. Milne, “" e Mahathir Administration 
in Malaysia : Discipline through Islam”, Pacifi c Aff airs 56 (4) Winter 1983-84, 631-648, 
Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysia’s Foreign Policy, (London : Routledge, 1997).
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since the era of the Malacca Sultanate until today. ! is, together with 
the image of Saudi Arabia, which is habitually considered as one of the 
Islamic states5 and the custodian of two Islamic Holy Places, Mecca and 
Medina, but more importantly, the continuous maintenance of Malaysia’s 
mutual relations with the custodian of two Holy Places, could be viewed 
as part of the portrayal of the Tun Dr. Mahathir’s religious approach in 
facing domestic religious pressures. ! is especially concerns the highly 
domestic appeal (particularly by the Malaysian Muslims) for Islam, 
usually in matters related to pilgrimage and education in the Kingdom, 
and to counter Islamic opposition parties as well as to manifest Malaysia’s 
close affi  liation with her Muslim counterparts, including the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, which is so signifi cant for its political continuance in the 
Muslim world at large. In order to examine this argument, the study will 
critically evaluate how the Tun Dr. Mahathir’s leadership responds to this 
challenge. ! e discussion will begin fi rst with an introductory account 
of Malaysia’s relations with Saudi Arabia during Tun Dr. Mahathir 
era, and later will develop into an analysis to relate the signifi cance of 
the relations for the survival and the political interests of the Tun Dr. 
Mahathir regime.
MALAYSIA’S RELATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA DURING 
DR. MAHATHIR ERA
It is publicly well-known that Tun Dr. Mahathir is the longest serving 
Prime Minister of Malaysia. He took over from Tun Hussein, who 
withdrew due to poor health, in 1981. Without looking back to the era 
of his predecessors, Tun Dr. Mahathir made a few dynamic changes 
to Malaysia’s external relations at the international level. He stressed 
5 A few researchers defi ne distinctly between Islamic state and Muslim state. ! e 
former refers to the complete regulation of Shari’ah for both the government and the 
administration, whereas the latter, still considers the Shari’ah Laws important, but the 
implementation is separable from the government, and it usually applies to the religious 
institutions. David George, “Pax Islamica : An Alternative New World Order?”, in A.S. 
Sidahmed & A. Ehteshamic (ed.) Islamic Fundamentalism (Boulder : Westview Press, 
1996), 88, Patricia A. Martinez, “! e Islamic State or the State of Islam in Malaysia”, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 23 (3) December 2003, 492-493 (Patricia highlights more on 
the defi nition of an Islamic state, and attempts it to link with the Malaysian situation). 
Political Managements and Policies in Malaysia
147
ASEAN regional co-operation (security, political and socio-economic 
fi elds), closer relations with Islamic countries, especially with the Middle 
Eastern counterparts, and also put emphasis upon the implementation of 
the Look East Policy in the Malaysian economy.6  His longer term as the 
Prime Minister of Malaysia, compared to the previous leaders, gave him 
more opportunities to augment Malaysia’s relations with other countries, 
mainly the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
As soon as he became Prime Minister, Tun Dr. Mahathir and his offi  cials, 
Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah (Ministry of Finance), Tengku Ahmad 
Rithaudden (Ministry of Trade and Industry), Tan Sri Ghazali Shafi ee 
(Ministry of Foreign Aff airs), went to the Gulf States, including Saudi 
Arabia from March 5 to 7, 1982. Prior to his trip, the King of Malaysia, 
Sultan Haji Ahmed Shah and other offi  cials had arrived on January 24, 
1982. # e King also discussed socio-economic opportunities as well as 
the issues of the Palestinian and the Arab World.7 Tun Dr. Mahathir’s 
trip had two missions, fi rstly to discuss and to mediate on the Iran-Iraq 
war in Jeddah (where the Saudi government was the host to discuss the 
war), and secondly to look for new economic and investment prospects 
as well as to obtain fi nancial assistance from the Gulf States to further 
accelerate Malaysian development projects. In the case of Iran-Iraq war, 
Malaysia had been selected by the Organisation of Islamic Conference 
(OIC) with other six members, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the PLO, Turkey, 
Senegal, and Gambia, to bring about a ceasefi re between Iran and Iraq. 
Nevertheless, their eff orts to persuade both confl icting parties to end the 
crisis were fruitless.8
6 For example, see David Camroux, “Looking East and Inwards : Internal Factors in 
Malaysian Foreign Relations During the Mahathir Era, 1981-1994”, Australia-Asia 
Paper No. 72 (Griffi  th University : Faculty of Asian and International Studies, Centre for 
the Study of Australia-Asia Relations, October 1994), 14-29.
7 Saudi Review, 24th January, 1982, Saudi Review, 26th January, 1982.
8 Even Malaysia, during the Muslim Summit in Baghdad, had proposed seven ways to 
cease the confl ict, but failed. Fariza Hanum Ahmad Ramli, “Sejarah Hubungan Malaysia-
Asia Barat Sehingga 1985”, Latihan Ilmiah, Kuala Lumpur : Universiti Kebangsaan 
Malaysia, 115-118,  “Diplomat Mahathir on Peace Mission”,  # e Star, March 5, 1982.
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Among the Gulf States visited by Tun Dr. Mahathir were Bahrain, Oman, 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia. ! e visit was to 
expand the signing of new agreements in economic and technical co-
operation since the era of Tun Razak in 1975, and Tun Hussein in 1976 
and onwards, where Malaysia had received six loans amounting to $248 
million from Saudi Arabia. 62 per cent from these loans was utilized in 
land development projects in the National University of Malaysia, the 
National Technology of Malaysia, and Maktab Rendah Sains Mara.9 
During his trip to the Gulf States in 1982, Tun Dr. Mahathir also managed 
to secure a few loans from Saudi Arabia. For example, a loan agreement 
of $10.6 million from the Saudi Fund had been signed between Tengku 
Razaleigh Hamzah (Malaysia’s Finance Minister) and Mohammad A. 
Al-Sugair (Deputy Chairman of the Saudi Fund) in Kuala Lumpur. ! e 
loan was to build fi ve hospitals in the states of Kedah, Kelantan and 
Terengganu. ! e Saudi government also promised to distribute another 
$58 million from the Saudi Fund for the second phase of the East-West 
Highway10 construction, and on January 24 1986, the Saudi Development 
Fund approved SR189.00 million (equivalent to RM132.2 million) for 
the second phase of two projects, the Port Project in Penang Island, and 
East-West Highway.  Up until 1984, the overall loan from the Saudi Fund 
was $252.2 million.11  Furthermore, in 1985, the Malaysian government 
allowed the National Shipping Company of Saudi Arabia (NSCSA)12  to 
have access to the Malaysian ports. ! is led to the setting up of a Joint-
Committee between the National Trade and Commerce Council of 
Malaysia and the Middle East Trade, Industry and Agriculture Council, 
which indirectly expanded the areas of bilateral trade relations for both 
9 Fariza Hanum Ahmad Ramli, op.cit, 106.
10 Ministry of Finance, Laporan Ekonomi 1986/87 (Kuala Lumpur : Jabatan Percetakan 
Negara, 1986), 151.
11 ! e loan given by the Saudi Fund (along with ! e Kuwaiti Fund amounted $137.8 
million) was mainly utilized in agriculture projects, education, land development and 
medical facilities. ! is loan may exclude the loan for the second phase as it was only 
approved in 1986. See Fariza Hanum Ahmad Ramli, op.cit, 108, and economic report by 
the Ministry of Finance, Laporan Ekonomi 1986/87 (Kuala Lumpur : Jabatan Percetakan 
Negara, 1986), 151 for an useful explanation.
12 See website of National Shipping Company of Saudi Arabia (http://www.nscsa.com/
htmls/Ofcs_MdlEast.html)
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parties. Besides that, Tun Dr. Mahathir’s government also created various 
trade exhibitions in the Middle East in order to attract more potential 
buyers for Malaysian products.13 Not only that, but Malaysia’s relations 
with Saudi Arabia in the 1980s were further boosted by the visit as well 
as by appreciation from a few Saudi offi  cials who came to Malaysia, such 
as the meeting of Dr. Ali Aziz Al-Khudiri (Assistant-Deputy of Media 
Radio and Information, Saudi Arabia), and Mr. Kasim Ahmad (Deputy 
of Information Minister, Malaysia) on January 22, 1985, which brought 
another agreement signed on the launch of Islamic Radio Programme 
called ‘Nida ul-Islam’ between Malaysia and Saudi Arabia.14
As the relationship headed towards the 1990s, most of the eff orts were 
concentrated towards improving and balancing trade exchanges between 
Malaysia and Saudi Arabia as the former was running a defi cit in its 
bilateral trade relations with the latter. For instance, from 1999 to 2000, 
Malaysia’s trade relation with Saudi Arabia was registered as one of the 
highest defi cits, about –RM1,19.24 million, and the Saudi government 
only ranked 27 in Malaysia’s external trade relations, whereas the 
United States, the European countries, Japan and Singapore were the 
main trading partners.15 # en, in trade agreements, Malaysia and Saudi 
Arabia only managed to secure three major signings: the Economic and 
Technical Cooperation Agreement 1975 (Tun Razak era), the Cultural 
and Scientifi c Cooperation Agreement 1976 (Tun Hussein era), and 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation Agreement 1993 (Tun Dr. Mahathir 
era).16
13 Fariza Hanum Ahmad Ramli, op.cit, 106-111.
14 “Saudi Arabia, Penolong Timbalan Media Radio dan Penyiaran dan Timbalan 
Penerangan, En. Kassim Ahmad Menandatangani Minit Mesyuarat Mengenai 
Rancangan NIDAL AL-ISLAM di Kuala Lumpur, January 22, 1985”, Rekod Pandang 
dan Dengar, National Archive of Malaysia (2001/0049389, G.19507).
15 Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation (MATRADE), “Overseas Market 
Information, Saudi Arabia”, (MATRADE Branch, Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia, 
1999-2000).
16 # e Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), “Opening of Caravan 
Malaysia 2003 Jeddah, Saudi Arabia”, December 7, 2003 (http://www.miti.gov.my/
speech-7dec03.html), Saudia Online, May 22, 2001 (http://www.saudia-online.com/
maynews/Business56.htm), “Signing of Bilateral Investment Guarantee Agreement 
(IGA) and the Accession of Saudi Arabia to the WTO”, MITI (http://www.miti.gov.
my/press34a.htm).
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  erefore, various attempts were taken by Tun Dr. Mahathir’s government, 
particularly in the economic fi eld, to hasten the volume of trade and 
investment by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia into Malaysia. For example, 
since the tragedy of the economic crisis in 1997, the Middle East region, 
especially Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States, have become the main 
target of the Malaysian government in looking for new markets and 
investment overseas. One of the most potential attractions, along with 
the eff orts to increase volume exports, and to enlarge the quantity of 
exports of various products, which has been emphasized by the National 
Economic Plan Council of Malaysia after the economic crisis in 1997, 
is the tourism industry which endeavours to entice more Saudi visitors 
to Malaysia.17 In other words, in the post-crisis of 1997, Malaysia has 
attempted to change the pattern of its relations with Saudi Arabia from 
one to two ways of communication, by depending less upon the fi nancial 
assistance of the Kingdom and by gearing towards fair bilateral economic 
relations in the future.18
  e above statement may be linked to the offi  cial visits by Prince Abdul 
Aziz, the Second Deputy of Defence Minister of Saudi Arabia to Malaysia 
in May 2001, followed by Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister (later became 
Malaysian Prime Minister in 2003), YAB Datuk Abdullah Badawi to 
the Kingdom in September 2001 to meet King Fahd. In those visits, 
various issues and events were discussed, but specifi cally on economic 
and investment opportunities, including tourism.19   ese two offi  cial 
visits also led to the Second Saudi-Malaysian Commission meeting in 
Kuala Lumpur, which lasted three days, concluding on May 12, 2001. In 
this meeting, Ibn Mohammed Al-Kurdi, the Secretary General of the 
17 Prior to the crisis, tourists from the Middle East region had contributed to RM11.3 
billion from 1990-1996 to the development of the Malaysian economy. See Majlis 
Tindakan Ekonomi Negara, “Pelan Pemulihan Ekonomi Negara : Agenda Tindakan”, 
(Kuala Lumpur, Ogos 1998), 218 & 221. 
18 Interview with Raja Saiff ul Ridzuwan Raja Kamaruddin, Assistant Secretary for 
West Asia & North Africa, Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, April 2, 2003, 10.00-11.00 am, 
Putrajaya, Kuala Lumpur.
19 Interview with Raja Saiff ul Ridzuwan Raja Kamaruddin, Assistant Secretary for 
West Asia & North Africa, Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, April 2, 2003, 10.00-11.00 am, 
Putrajaya, Kuala Lumpur.
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Council of the Saudi Chambers of Commerce and Industry revealed that 
both countries have identifi ed potential areas which could be improved, 
particularly on the Saudi non-export oil to Malaysia, participation in 
joint investment, the implementation of the new regulation of Umrah 
(minor pilgrimage), and Saudi tourism in Malaysia, as well as announcing 
that the volume of trade exchange between Malaysia and Saudi Arabia 
amounted to SR2188 million in 2000.20 ! e other event was on October 
2002, when Tun Dr. Mahathir was offi  cially invited to Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia to present a keynote address in a seminar on “! e Future Vision 
for the Saudi Economy”. In the seminar, Tun Dr. Mahathir addressed 
how the Saudi government can vary their economic resources by not 
merely depending on crude oil to be exported abroad. ! e re-aff orestation 
of deserts using artifi cial irrigation and oil conversion into other products 
such as electrical power, may make the Saudi economy more stable in the 
future.21
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TUN DR. MAHATHIR 
REGIME
Similar to his predecessors, Tun Dr. Mahathir realizes the signifi cance 
of continuous relations with Saudi Arabia for Malaysian interests both 
domestically and internationally. Apart from successfully securing 
economic opportunities from the Saudi government, Tun Dr. Mahathir 
also needs to take advantage of the close relations to portray his religious 
commitments both at domestic and international stage. As has been said 
before, the portrayal of religious commitment is vital for the continuance 
of Malaysian political regimes’ survival.  On some occasions, however, 
the study might fi nd it diffi  cult to specifi cally relate Tun Dr. Mahathir’s 
government’s relations with Saudi Arabia to the portrayal of Islam, 
both at the domestic and international level. ! is is because the nature 
of the Tun Dr. Mahathr regime’s religious commitment is broader, and 
20 “12/05/2001 Saudi-Malaysian Commission Concludes Meeting”, Saudi Arabian 
Information Resource, 12th May 2001 (http://www.saudinf.com/main/y2488.htm).
21 “Seminar on the Future Vision for the Saudi Economy”, the King Faisal Hall 
Riyadh Inter-Continental Hotel, October 19th 2002, Prime Minister Offi  ce, Putrjaya, 
Malaysia.
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does not merely focus on one single issue or a Muslim country. Tun Dr. 
Mahathir has been involved in countless Islamic aff airs ranging from the 
issue of Muslim minorities in the Southeast Asian region,22 Palestine,23 
Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War, Balkan crisis,24 and others.
His government also organized many International Islamic Seminars, 
most of which were philosophical knowledge-oriented, such as Islamic 
Approach Towards Technological Development (1983), Islamic 
Civilization (1984), Islamic " ought (1984), Islamic management for 
the Asia-Pacifi c Region (1986), Islam and the Philosophy of Science 
(1989). Moreover, the relentless challenge from the Islamic opposition 
party (PAS), which at present does not consider Saudi Arabia to be the 
best model of an Islamic State,25 led Tun Dr. Mahathir’s government to 
seek wider relations with Muslim countries. Since the eruption of the 
Iranian Revolution in 1979, PAS has admired the model of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini and the relations between 
both parties have been maintained, and also a series of diplomatic visits 
are continuously active.26
" is is not to say, however, that religious portrayal is irrelevant to Malaysia’s 
relations with Saudi Arabia in the Tun Dr. Mahathir era. It is certainly 
signifi cant since the issues of pilgrimage, education, membership of the 
22 " e level of intervention is limited due to Malaysia’s closer commitment to ASEAN 
spirit. Malaysia has to respect the sovereignty of those countries, which have some 
Muslim minorities such as Pattani, southern " ailand, and MORO movement in 
southern Philippines.
23 Granted PLO offi  ce in Kuala Lumpur embassy status in 1981. David Camroux, 
“State Responses to Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia : Accommodation, Co-option and 
Confrontation”, Asian Survey, xxxvi (9), 866.
24 Dr. Mahathir sent 1,400 Malaysian troops to Bosnia-Herzogovina to carry out 
humanitarian aid. David Camroux, op.cit, 867.
25 " is particularly refers to the question of Saudi guardianship in the Holy city of Mecca 
during the 1990 hajj in Mina where there occurred the tragic death of thousands of 
pilgrims, including that of 153 Malaysians, and also to some of Saudi’s lenient policy 
towards certain controversial Muslim issues mainly the Palestinians (peace treaty with 
Israel), and the stationing of US troops in the Kingdom. Shanti Nair, op.cit, 146.
26 Fred R. von der Mehden, “Malaysian and Indonesian Islamic Movements and the 
Iranian Connection”, in John L. Esposito (ed.)  e Iranian Revolution : Its Global Impact, 
(Miami : Florida International University Press, 1990), 248.
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OIC, and some religious programmes at the domestic level still bring 
Malaysia closer to Saudi Arabia. For example, in lessening PAS and 
other dakwah organizations’ appeal for a more Islamic policy, Tun Dr. 
Mahathir has launched Islamization programmes27 in some government 
or banking institutions such as the establishment of the International 
Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM),28 Islamic Economic Development 
Foundation, Islamic Banking of Malaysia Berhad, and the emphasis of 
the assimilation of Islamic values among the Muslim government staff  
through the Islamic Consultative Body. " e concept of the Islamization 
programme may be considered vital for Tun Dr. Mahathir’s government 
(although it has raised some worries among the non-Muslim community) 
as his early era was at the beginning of the Iranian Revolution, and the 
Islamic resurgence, which began in the 1970s. " e challenge from the 
Islamic party and religious organizations, which had been increasing 
since the late Tun Hussein Onn, further pushed Tun Dr. Mahathir’s 
administration towards the implementation of Islam in the whole system 
of government. " us, by implementing the Islamization programme, 
they may to some extent soothe the pressure from these groups and the 
Muslim community at large, who demanded ‘more Islam’ in the conduct 
of public aff airs.29
Indirectly too, through the implementation of Islamization programmes, 
it will give Malaysia fi nancial benefi ts, for instance by receiving, at least 
27 Due to misunderstanding, various parties, including the former fi rst Prime Minister, 
Tunku Abdul Rahman, urged Dr. Mahathir to halt the launch of Islamization 
Programme. Islamization programme defi ned by Anwar Ibrahim, one of Dr. Mahathir’s 
cabinet member, as a process designed to inject more spiritual values into the Malaysian 
or Muslim way of life, to bridge the spiritual-material gap, to unite Muslims, but not 
turn them into religious fanatics. Datuk Musa Hitam, Deputy Prime Minister, noted 
that the government eff ort was more towards striking a balance between the spiritual and 
material. Diane K. Mauzy & R.S. Milne, “" e Mahathir Administration in Malaysia : 
Discipline " rough Islam”, Pacifi c Aff airs 56 (4) Winter 1983-85, 631.
28 " e main concept of the International Islamic University of Malaysia was based on 
the ideals of First World Conference on Muslim Education in Mecca, Saudi Arabia 
in 1976. " is university is fi nancially co-sponsored among OIC members. Khoo Boo 
Teik, Paradoxes of Mahathirism : An Intellectual Biography of Mahathir Mohammad, (Kuala 
Lumpur : Oxford University Press, 1995),193.
29 Khoo Boo Teik, ibid, 175.
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once a year by request, capital contributions from Saudi Arabia for the 
running of Islamic institutions, especially to the International Islamic 
University of Malaysia (IIUM), and also to several dakwah organizations 
as well as religious schools in Malaysia.30 Along with that, by executing 
the Islamization process in only a few government and banking 
institutions, rather than applying the whole Islamic Laws all over 
Malaysian institutions, the Tun Dr. Mahathir regime’s closeness to the 
moderate block of Muslim-Arab countries will be portrayed, especially 
to Saudi Arabia, which is relatively less comfortable with the drastic way 
of the Iranian Revolution in practicing Islamic principles in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran.31
Furthermore, to ensure that the process of Islamization ran smoothly, 
Tun Dr. Mahathir successfully brought Anwar Ibrahim into the United 
Malay National Organization (UMNO) in 1982. ! e joining of Anwar 
Ibrahim in the government can be regarded as a pacifi er for Tun Dr. 
Mahathir’s administration in facing Islamic pressure, especially from 
the Islamic opposition party and non-governmental organizations in 
Malaysia. ! is is because it would weaken the infl uence of PAS as well 
as other dakwah organizations, such as the movement of Darul Arqam, 
which was eventually banned by the government in 1994 since some of 
its basic teachings deviated from Islam,32 and also to run those Islamic 
30 Interview with Prof. D. Sano Koutoub Moustafa, Member of the International Fiqh 
Academy of OIC, International Islamic University of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 
May 9, 2003.
31 For instance, in 1983, the Saudi Kingdom arrested seven Malaysians contravening 
Saudi Law through the possession of material evidence indicating rebellious intention 
by having posters and photographs of Khomeini. Nevertheless, Malaysia successfully 
convinced the Kingdom that they referred only to ‘individual actions’. See Shanti Nair, 
op.cit, 166.
32 ! e ban of Al-Arqam considered by most of the Muslim Arab countries, including Saudi 
Arabia as Malaysia’s internal matter, and even Saudi’s Wahabism found incompatible with 
Al-Arqam’s philosophical teachings. Discussion with Dr. Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, 
via e-mail, who has done on Al-Arqam for his Ph.D, entitled : “Islamic Resurgence in the 
Periphery : A Study of Political Islam in Contemporary Malaysia with Special Reference 
to the Darul Arqam Movement”, March 1998, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK. 
See also David Camroux, op.cit,  863-865.
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institutions eff ectively.33 Moreover, the admission of Anwar was not only 
benefi cial for Malaysia domestically but also at the international level in 
strengthening Muslims’ networks. " is is because the image of Anwar 
Ibrahim, as one of the former Islamic leaders in one of the well-known 
Muslim organizations, ABIM, might promote Malaysia’s religious 
commitment especially to the Muslim-Arab world.34
Besides that, there are a few international events with which Tun Dr. 
Mahathir’s policy are not compatible or coincidentally parallel, with 
Saudi Arabian interests such as the matter of the PLO’s loss of the moral 
and fi nancial support of several Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, 
after the Gulf War ended, condemning its support of Iraq, and also the 
call by the United States for the PLO to sit for peace negotiations with 
Israel. Although most of the Arab countries have been less content with 
the PLO’s attitude in the Gulf War, Tun Dr. Mahathir has endlessly 
given his support for the PLO, during Yasser Arafat’s visit to Malaysia, 
and indicated some of his opinions on the issue of peace negotiation 
by arguing that no big nation could violate the sovereignty of a weak 
nation.35 At the onset of the Gulf War, Tun Dr. Mahathir’s government 
backed U.N. Resolution 678 against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and urged 
33 Although at the early stage Anwar was seen as closer to Iran due to his visit to Iran two 
weeks after the revolution, while he was the President of ABIM, but his decision to join 
UMNO, and not PAS, suffi  ce to indicate that Anwar’s modernist and universalist view 
of Islam was closer to that of Mahathir than PAS. David Camroux, op.cit, 859, Simon 
Barraclough, “Managing the Challenges of Islamic Revival in Malaysia : A Regime 
Perspective”, Asian Survey xxiii (8) August 1983, 968.
34 Anwar Ibrahim has various Islamic organization networks including the Rabithah 
al ’Alam al-Islami of Saudi Arabia, the Islamic Council of Europe, the Islamic Foundation 
in UK, and others. Along with that, while he was the Deputy of Prime Minister, this 
former ABIM leader also held the Presidency of the International Islamic University 
of Malaysia, and he worked well with the Rector of the university, Prof. Abu Suleyman 
Hamid, a Saudi citizen, in running the university. Unfortunately, Anwar Ibrahim was 
sacked by Dr. Mahathir in September 1998 due to personal misconduct and bribery 
charges. Fadzillah Mohd. Jamil, “" e Reawakening of Islamic Consciousness in Malaysia 
: 1970-1987”, Unpublished Ph.D.  esis (Edinburgh : University of Edinburgh, June 1988), 
150, International Islamic University of Malaysia, Undergraduate Prospectus 1992-1993 
(Petaling Jaya : IIUM Press, 1992-1993).
35 Cheah Boon Kheng, Malaysia :  e Making of a Nation, (Singapore : Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), 215.
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Saddam Hussein to withdraw from the occupied territory. But Malaysia 
declined a public request from Saudi Arabia to send its troops and 
would only do that if Mecca and Medina were attacked. However, in the 
middle of the war, Tun Dr. Mahathir’s policy changed a little with more 
sympathy given towards the innocent Iraqi people. ! is change might 
be due to the sentiments of the Malaysian community after watching 
the bombings and the death of women and children in Iraq, through the 
media and newspapers, and the subsequent pressure on the government 
to review its policy.36 To some extent, Tun Dr. Mahathir’s policy towards 
the Gulf War may be parallel to the Saudis’ approach to the harsh 
action taken by Saddam Hussein, especially at the beginning of the war. 
Nevertheless, in the middle of the war, the Kingdom possibly disagreed 
with the Malaysian attitude because if the U.N coalition failed to force 
Saddam out of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia could become the next target of the 
Iraqi leader. ! erefore, the need for incessant action by the U.N. troops 
as well as the stationing of U.S troops in the Kingdom was really needed, 
although it raised some disagreements among Muslim countries.
Along with that, Tun Dr. Mahathir also openly criticized the weak role 
of the OIC in resolving Muslims’ problems and disagreements among its 
members, specifi cally on inter-Arab or Arab-Iranian rivalry.37 In 1989, for 
instance, while giving a speech at the Muslim Summit, Taif, Saudi Arabia, 
Tun Dr. Mahathir repeatedly called on OIC members, particularly Saudi 
Arabia and other Gulf states, urging them to take a bigger role in uniting 
OIC members and ending all misunderstandings, and also emphasizing 
self-reliance among themselves.38 At the same time also, he took a few 
initiatives to bridge the gaps and misunderstandings among the Arabs 
including showing his support for the re-admission of Egypt into the 
OIC after its membership was cancelled for controversially signing the 
36 Shanti Nair, op.cit, 245-246.
37 ! e rivalries were more on the leadership struggle to dominate the Arab world or 
Middle East region such as King Feisal vs Gamal Abdel Nasser, the issue of Egypt’s 
peace process with Israel in the Camp David Agreement and Iran-Iraq War.
38 Gomathi A/P Vanathan, “Penglibatan Malaysia Di Dalam OIC, 1969-1990”, Latihan 
Ilmiah, (Kuala Lumpur : Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1995/1996), 34.
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peace process with Israel at Camp David, which most of the Muslim 
countries were against.
CONCLUSION
Frankly to say, it is quite hard to particularly associate religious 
commitment in Tun Dr. Mahathir’s era with Malaysia’s relations with 
Saudi Arabia, apart from successfully securing economic opportunities 
from the kingdom. ! is is because the level of the Tun Dr. Mahathir 
regime’s involvement in Muslim aff airs is broad and does not merely 
concentrate on one issue or a Muslim country. Moreover, the Islamic 
opposition party and other dakwah organizations seem no longer to 
regard Saudi Arabia as the best model of a good Islamic state, for they 
believe that the Islamic Republic of Iran can lead all Muslim countries to 
a better and prosperous achievement in the political and socio-economic 
fi elds. Nevertheless, Tun Dr. Mahathir’s administration still manages to 
stand fi rm on the more suitable approach in dealing with these challenges 
by introducing Islamization programmes, which is quite liberal and 
moderate, not only to the Muslim community but also to non-Muslims, 
domestically and internationally.
In certain points however, Malaysia’s relations with Saudi Arabia during 
Tun Dr. Mahathir’s era, changed dynamically, specifi cally in the 1990s. 
Several initiatives had been taken by the Tun Dr. Mahathir regime to 
shift the pattern of relations from one to two way communication. For 
example, in the economic development, Tun Dr. Mahathir’s administration 
encourages the Kingdom to open up more markets for Malaysian 
products, and at the same time tries not to merely depend upon the 
Saudi loans to build more development projects. At several International 
Islamic Conferences, Tun Dr. Mahathir also frequently insisted that 
the Kingdom play a bigger role in solving Muslims’ misunderstandings 
among themselves, and in helping the plight of the Palestinians, and 
Muslim minorities in other countries. Tun Dr. Mahathir’s emphasis on 
maintaining relations with Muslim countries as well as being active in 
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promoting Islam has been the major feature of his foreign policy; as 
he said: “It is always our intention to play an active role in the Islamic 
dakwah movement, both locally and internationally. It is our policy to 
be closely associated with Islamic nations and to support Islamic causes. 
We in Malaysia will continue to do everything with our means to assist 
the struggle of the Muslim ummah, for the right to live the life of the 
Muslims”.  Equipped with this liberal-pragmatic Islamic approach has, 
to some extent, prolonged the survival of the Tun Dr. Mahathir’s political 
regime interests both at domestic and international level.
